Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc., 362 P.2d 1021 (Mont. 1961) by Andriolo, Richard J.
Montana Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 1 Fall 1961 Article 7
1961
Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc., 362 P.2d 1021
(Mont. 1961)
Richard J. Andriolo
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana
Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Richard J. Andriolo, Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc., 362 P.2d 1021 (Mont. 1961), 23 Mont. L. Rev. (1961).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol23/iss1/7
RECENT DECISIONS
opinion, the court in a proper case would reject the minority rule. Because
the question of how much weight should be given on appeal to contradic-
tory testimony of a party seldom arises in Montana, the supreme court
wisely took this opportunity to clarify its position.
It is submitted that the decision in this case was proper; the former
rule followed in Montana created a presumption of falsehood as to the
party's statements and invaded the province of the lower court as to the
findings of fact. The adoption of the majority rule is a step toward uni-
formity among the states and recognition of the practicalities in the
presentation of evidence at the trial.
JACQUE W. BEST
MASTER PLAN ZONING STATUTES HELD TO BE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY-The Master Plan Act,' enacted
by the 1957 legislature, provided for a system of zoning involving the co-
operation of the city and county governments. The Act provided for the
establishment of a city-county planning board which would be empowered
to recommend a plan to include such property in the county as "in the
judgment of the board bears reasonable relation to the development of the
city";' the plan was subject to approval by the county and city govern-
ments insofar as their respective lands were affected; the purposes pro-
vision also provided "that additional powers be granted legislative bodies
of cities and counties to carry out the purposes of this act."' Pursuant to
these powers and after the adoption of a Master Plan for the City of Bil-
lings and the County of Yellowstone, the County of Yellowstone sought to
enjoin acts violative of the Plan as it affected the county areas. Defend-
ant's demurrer to the complaint challenging the constitutionality of the
Act and actions taken pursuant to it, was sustained by the district court.
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The Master
Plan Act does not adequately set the standards and define the bounds
within which an administrative body must act and is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. Plath v. Hi-Ball Cantractors, Inc., 362
P.2d 1021 (Mont. 1961)."
The decision involves a consideration of two basic questions. First,
did the legislature intend to grant legislative powers to counties? And
second, was the power delegated legislative or were sufficient standards
set forth in the statute so that the power delegated could be considered ad-
ministrative ?
Section 11-3801 of the Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, after stating
the purposes of the Master Plan Act provides "that additional powers be
granted legislative bodies of cities and counties to carry out the purposes
of this act." The Montana Supreme Court stated that the legislature in-
'RviszD CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 11-3801 to -3858, as amended. Hereinafter
REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.2R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3880.8R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3801.
'Petition for Clarification of Opinion was denied July 1961.
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tended, by these words, to grant legislative powers to counties.' The court,
basing its conclusion on the aforesaid wording of the statute, held that the
legislature actually intended to do an unconstitutional act, i.e., delegate
legislative powers to counties. The court considered this intention to be
"the crux of the entire matter,'" and the primary reason for holding the
statutes unconstitutional.
It must always be presumed that the legislature intended to act within
the scope of its authority,7 and if two or more interpretations of a statute
are possible the one favoring the constitutionality of the statute must be
accepted.8 It is possible that section 11-3801 could be interpreted as fol-
lows: additional powers are granted to legislative bodies of cities and ad-
ditional powers are granted to counties to carry out the purposes of this
act. Such an interpretation has considerable merit for two reasons. First,
the legislature used the word powers; it did not say legislative powers.
Second, such a construction would simply mean that the legislature intend-
ed the legislative bodies of cities to have these additional powers and not the
executive or judicial branches in view of section 11-102 which provides
that every city has legislative, execative, and judicial power. No such
qualifying phrase was necessary when referring to counties inasmuch as
the only governmental body of a county is the Board of County Commis-
sioners. Furthermore, the court's interpretation must necessarily assume
that the legislators who drafted the statute erroneously thought counties
had legislative bodies. It seems preferable to avoid such an assumption and
the interpretation suggested above would do just that.
Whichever of these interpretations we accept, we are still faced with
the second question, i.e., could the power actually delegated be considered
administrative rather than legislative? No constitutional problem would
be raised if the delegation to the counties was merely that of administra-
tive power. It has been held that powers normally considered legislative
can be treated as administrative if they are merely to "fill in the details.' "
If the Master Plan Act merely gives to the planning boards and the coun-
ties the task of filling in the details of a statute worded in general terms,
the power delegated would be administrative. The delegation of such power
would be constitutional regardless of what the statute calls it and regard-
less of what the legislature intended; merely labeling it legislative power
6The clause granting additional powers is referred to several times by the court.
The emphasis supplied by the court in the clause as it was quoted at page 1025 of
the instant case clearly shows how the court interpreted the clause: "that addi-
tional powers be granted legi8lative bodies of cities and counties. . . ." At page 1023
the court stated, "[T]he following sections [the sections of the statute following the
additional powers clause] purport to grant cottnties legislative powers as such."(Emphasis supplied by the court.)
'lnstant case at 1023.
'State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365, 368-69, 52 P.2d 890, 891 (1935).
8State v. Stark, .supra note 7. The unconstitutionality of a statute must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt before the court will declare it unconstitutional. Herrin
v. Erickson, 90 Mont. 259, 275, 2 P.2d 296, 302-03 (1931).9R.C.M. 1947, § 16-802 provides that the powers exercised by countuie8 "can only be
exercised by the board of county commissioners, or by agents, and officers acting
under their authority, or authority of law." Furthermore, it has been held that
counties have no legislative powers; they are administrative agents of the state.
Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 141-42, 131 Pac. 30, 32 (1913) ; State ex- rel. City
of Missoula v. Holmes, Ins. Comm'r, 100 Mont. 256, 274, 47 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1935).1United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
[ Vol. 23,
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should not make its delegation to a county unconstitutional." No general
formula can be followed in determining whether a grant of power is "leg-
islative" or merely "administrative." The Montana rule for such a deter-
mination was set out in Bacus v. Lake County:'
• . . [A] statute is complete and validly delegates administrative
authority when nothing with respect to what is the law is left to
the administrative agency, and its provisions are sufficiently clear,
definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and
obligations. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
Each case must be decided by applying this general rule to the particular
facts." The legislature is not confined to that method of executing policy
which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative
bodies.' The legislature is not required to legislate further than is prac-
ticable for the guidance of administrative bodies.' . The policy of the law
and the standard of action can be laid down in very broad and general
terms," provided it is capable of reasonable application." And the suf-
ficiency of such declarations varies with the complexity of the subject to
which the law is to be applied.'
Some courts have held that it is not even necessary for the statute to
prescribe a specific rule of action." This is particularly true where it is
difficult or impractical to state a definite, comprehensive rule or where the
discretion to be exercised by the administrative officials relates to regula-
tions imposed for the protection of public health, morals, safety, and the
general welfare. ' Thus, the modern tendency is to sustain delegations
of authority to administrative bodies when such bodies are guided only by
general standards.' For example, Freeman v. Board of Adjustment' in-
volved a statute which delegated authority to a zoning board to grant "such
variances from the terms of this ordinance as will not be contrary to the
public interest, where owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of
the provisions of this ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so
that the spirit of this ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice
don.' '  (Emphasis supplied.) This statute was upheld. And in State ex
rel. Stewart v. District Court' the court upheld a statute which granted
"In determining whether a statute is constitutional, regard is to be given substance
and not form. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) ; Chesebro v. Los An-
geles County Flood Control Dist., 306 U.S. 459, 464 (1939).
2354 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Mont. 1960). This passage is a direct quotation from 73 C.J.S.
Public Admtnistrative Bodie8 and Procedure § 29 (1951).
"State v. Vaughan, 30 Ala. App. 201, 4 So.2d 5, 8 (1941).1Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) ; American Power & Light Co. v.
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
"Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) ; Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village
of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 810 (1956).
"State v. Andre, 101 Mont. 366, 54 P.2d 566 (1936) ; State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365,
52 P.2d 890 (1935).
"Olp v. Town of Brighton, 19 N.Y.S.2d 546, 550 (1940).
"Mitchell v. Morris, 94 Cal. App. 2d 446, 210 P.2d 857, 859 (1949).
"Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wash. 2d 380, 119 P.2d 302, 309 (1941).
2Ibid.
'Annot. 58 A.L.R.2d 1087 (1958) and cases cited therein.
'97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534 (1934).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 11-2707.
"103 Mont. 487, 63 P.2d 141 (1936).
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the Beer Control Board the power to ". . . make such regulations as are
necessary and feasible for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
of this Act, and such regulations shall have the full force and effect of
law."'  (Emphasis supplied.)
A legislative act granting zoning power to counties with standards
remarkably similar to the standards set forth in the Master Plan Act was
held constitutional by the Montana Supreme Court in a decision handed
down on the same day that the instant case was decided. Under the statutes2
involved in City of Missoula v. Missoula County.' the county commissioners
were authorized to create a planning and zoning district when sixty percent
of the freeholders in the area petitioned for its creation.' Unlike the
Master Plan Act, the zoning under this act was not restricted by a territorial
limitation.' However, each act provides for a planning commission or
board.' The legislative purposes behind each act are definitely expressed
and identical, i.e., furthering the health, safety, and general welfare of
the people of the county. 1 In both acts the procedural matters and things
to be done are expressed in very broad and general terms."
Both acts contain similar provisions limiting the authority of the board
or commission. Under the Master Plan Act, the board must adopt a plan
which "in the judgment of the board. bears reasonable relation to the de-
-R.C.M. 1947, § 4-307.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 16-4101 to -4107.
"362 P.2d 539 (Mont. 1961).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4101.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4107.
"The County Planning and Zoning Districts Act provides for a planning and zoning
commisson. R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4101. The Master Plan Act provides for a planning
board. R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3801.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4102; R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3801. Similar language is also used in
R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3828. Actually the guidelines gleaned from the purposes of the
acts are more definite in the Master Plan Act; after stating the purpose indicated
above, the statute continues, "and to plan for the future development of their com-
munities to the end that highway systems be carefully planned, that new community
centers grow only with adequate highway, utility, health, educational, and recrea-
tional facilities; that the needs of agriculture, industry, and business be recognized
in future growth; that residential areas provide healthy surroundings for family
life; and that the growth of the community be commensurate with and promotive of
the efficient and economical use of public funds." R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3801.
'In both acts the board or commission is granted almost complete discretion in de-
termining the area to be zoned and the use to which the land can be put in these
zoned areas. The only limitation is that there shall be public notice and hear-
ings and the definitely expressed will of the legislature Is to be followed, i.e., fur-
thering the health, safety, and general welfare of the community by the use of a
definite plan for development. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 164101 to -4105, 11-3801, -3828, -3830,
-3833, 3856. The Master Plan Act provided a procedure for approval of the plan
by the governing bodies. However, the court in the instant case, while apparently
giving reasons why the standards were insufficient, held that all of the discretion
in the adoption of a Master Plan was lodged In the planning board. Instant case
at 1025. This argument could only be applied to cities and would be of no signifi-
cance when applied to counties inasmuch as counties can have no greater discretion
than the planning board, both of which have only administrative power. In fact,
under the County Planning and Zoning Districts Act approval of the plan drawn
up by the planning and zoning commission was not required. R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4104.
As previously indicated, this statute was upheld.
The Montana Supreme Court has said, "... if an Act but authorizes the ad-
ministrative officers or board to carry out the definitely expressed will of the leg-
islatiure, although procedural directions and the things to be done are specified
only in general terms, It is not vulnerable to the criticism that it carries a delega-
tion of legislative power." Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Board of
R.R. Comm'rs, 76 Mont. 305, 314-15, 247 Pac. 162, 164 (1926).
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velopment of the city.' " Under the County Planning and Zoning Districts
Act, the commission must adopt a development pattern for "the physical
and economic development of the planning and zoning district."'" More-
over, the acts have similar clauses granting additional powers to the board
or commission. The Master Plan Act provides "that additional powers
be granted... to carry out the purposes of this act.' The County Planning
and Zoning Districts Act provides that the commission "shall have such
powers as may be appropriate to enable it to fulfill its functions and duties
to promote county planning and to carry out the purposes of this act.'
The decision reached by the court in the instant case appears to be in
direct conflict with the decision in the City of Missoula case. Admittedly
the standards in both cases are very broad and there is some question as
to their sufficiency in either case. Broad standards, however, are per-
mitted, especially when a definite and comprehensive standard is difficult
to establish without limiting the effectiveness of the act. The court by its
ruling in the instant case has held that standards which were sufficient in
)ne set of zoning statutes are not sufficient in another set of zoning statutes.
Thus, in examining the Master Plan-Act, the court in the instant case
placed great emphasis on the clause granting additional powers. An inter-
pretation of this clause that would have saved the act's constitutionality
could have been adopted. However, regardless of the words found in this
additional powers clause, the court should have looked to the substance
of the act. The sufficiency of the statutory standards in the delegation
of administrative powers would then be put in issue. The standards in
this act, although broad, were sufficient. In fact, it is difficult to find
any significant difference in the standards set forth in this act and the
standards set forth in the County Planning and Zoning Districts Act held
constitutional in City of Missoula v. Missoula County. To be consistent
and to establish guide lines for the drafters of future county zoning leg-
islation, the court should have upheld the statutes in this case.
RICHARD J. ANDRIOLO
-R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3830.
UR.C.M. 1947, § 16-4102.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3801.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 164104.
The opinion in the City of Missoula case alleges a limitation of the zoning
power in the County Planning and Zoning District Act to three specified areas,
namely, the regulation of business carried On, the kind of buildings erected, and
the regulation of open areas around buildings. 362 P.2d at 542. However, § 16-4102
provides that the commission has the power to limit the "future uses of land or
buildings" located within its jurisdiction. In the light of these words, any limita-
tion as to the types of regulations that are authorized seems illusory, and no dis-
tinction can be made on this ground between the two zoning acts.
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